

## Vogtle 1

### 3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Apr 05, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

##### **Failure to Follow Chemical Control Procedures Results in Excessive Steam Generator Sodium Concentrations and Dual Unit Forced Shutdowns**

Failure to follow chemistry control procedures resulted in the wrong corrosion control chemicals being added to the feedwater systems on both units and the unplanned forced shutdown of Unit 1 and Unit 2 to Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, due to high sodium concentrations in both units' feedwater systems.

A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone objective by causing a perturbation of plant secondary side chemistry resulting in the unplanned forced shutdown of both units. The finding is of very low safety significance because the consequence of the chemical addition error was limited to the unplanned forced shutdown of both units. The direct cause of this finding involved the cross-cutting area of Human Performance.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

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#### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

##### **Failure to Reactivate Part 55 Licenses in Accordance with Procedure**

A non-cited violation was identified for the failure of multiple Part 55 licensees to reactivate Reactor Operator and Senior Reactor Operator licenses in accordance with procedure 10010-C, Operator Qualification Program, Revision (Rev) 2.

This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with human performance attributes of license reactivation that affect operational safety. The finding was evaluated using the Operator Requalification Human Performance SDP (IMC 0609 Appendix I) and determined of very low safety significance because more than 20 percent of the reactivation records reviewed failed to meet the requirements.

Inspection Report# : [2003004\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Properly Assemble CCW Valve 1HV11817 Results in CCW Transient**

Green. The improper reassembly of a Component Cooling Water isolation valve resulted in the loss of CCW inventory when CCW relief valves lifted.

A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified for maintenance personnel failure to follow valve reassembly procedures in March 2002. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the mitigating system cornerstone objective of equipment unavailability and reliability, in that, the lifting of system relief valves challenged the CCW system inventory. The finding is of very low safety significance because the CCW inventory loss was not in excess of the normal system makeup capability.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

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## Barrier Integrity

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

**Significance: SL-IV** Dec 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Falsification of Security Access Control System Records**

A Severity Level IV, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.9 was identified for the failure to maintain the results of a drug screening test and the associated entry in the licensee's Access Control System database complete and accurate in that the site Fitness-for-Duty Coordinator deliberately altered information indicating a specimen was negative for drugs when it was, in fact, positive for marijuana and amphetamines.

Because this issue involved willfulness on the part of a licensee employee and inaccurate information which impacts the regulatory process, it was not subject to the provisions of the Reactor Oversight Process, and was dispositioned in accordance with traditional enforcement. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because a barrier was lost in the physical security system in that the failure to properly categorize and report a positive drug test result had the potential to allow unescorted plant access to an individual who did not meet access requirements.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:** N/A Jan 03, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

### **Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection**

Overall, the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP) was effective at identifying, evaluating, and correcting problems. The threshold for entering problems into the CAP was low, resulting in a large number of Condition Reports (CRs). Problems entered into the CAP were adequately evaluated and appropriate actions were taken to resolve the problem. Recent events, including two reactor trips during low power feed water operations, and a dual unit shutdown due to secondary chemistry problems, were caused in part by human performance errors combined with weak supervisory oversight. The licensee is currently addressing these common root causes and developing corrective actions.

Some instances of missed problem identification were noted. System engineers were found to use the CAP effectively to address equipment issues. Quality Assurance organization audits were effective in identifying issues. Self-assessments were appropriate and findings were entered into the CAP. A safety conscious work environment was found where employees felt free to raise safety issues in CRs or the employee concerns program.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : December 01, 2003